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FAMILY LAW-VISITATION RIGHTS-KNOWN DONOR OF SPERM
USED IN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AWARDED VISITATION
RIGHTS-C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cum
berland County Ct. 1977).
Ms. C.C. and Mr. C.M. met in 1975. 1 Although the exact
nature of their ensuing relationship is unclear, it can best be de
scribed as casual, with only occasional dating. They neither lived
together, nor engaged in any sexual relations. C.C., however, told
C. M. that she wanted to give birth to a child conceived by artifi
cial insemination. C. M. volunteered the use of his semen. The two
then went to a doctor who referred them to a sperm bank. Although
the sperm bank refused the use of its facilities, probably because
C. C. was single, she learned from the attending physician of an
artificial insemination procedure using a glass syringe and a bell
jar. 2 After several months and numerous attempts, C.C. conceived
a child using this method.
Shortly after conception, C. C. and C. M.'s relationship termi
nated. Moreover, after the child's birth, C.C. prevented C.M.
from establishing any relationship with the child. C. C. paid all
hospital, doctor, and delivery costs, and provided for the child's
subsequent needs.
Against the foregoing background, C.M. brought suit for visi
tation rights. At the trial, C.M. testified that he and C.C. had
dated each other and had contemplated marriage. When he agreed
to provide his sperm in accordance with C.C.'s wishes, he believed
their marriage was imminent. He contended that it was not until
C.C. learned that she was pregnant that she terminated the rela
tionship. C.M. also maintained that up to that point he had as
sumed he would share parental responsibility for the child. 3
C.C., on the other hand, denied ever contemplating marriage
or any other serious relationship with C. M. In support ·of this con
tention she argued that the relationship had always been a strictly

1. The exact date of the commencement of their relationship is unclear from
the opinion, but the court alludes to the fact that C.C. and C.M. had known each
other for two years at the time of the trial. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 166, 377
A.2d 821, 824 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
2. C.M. remained in one room while C.C. attempted to inseminate herself in
another with semen provided by C.M. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 161, 377
A.2d 821, 821-22 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
3. Brief for Plaintiff at 1, C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821
(Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
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platonic one, that conception was accomplished through the use of
artincial insemination, and that she had paid for all delivery and
subsequent living expenses for the child. 4 She also claimed that her
original purpose in discussing the idea of artincial insemination
with C. M. was to inquire whether she should ask one of his friends
to supply the sperm. 5 Based on this conflicting testimony, the
court found for C. M., holding that a known donor of semen used
by an unmarried woman to artincially inseminate herself was the
natural father of the child and, as such, was entitled to visitation
rights. The court's decision has not been appealed.
For the purposes of this discussion, there are two types of
artincial insemination. 6 The classmcations relate to the supplier of
the sperm. Artincial Insemination Husband, or AIH, is the intro
duction of the husband's sperm into the wife. It is used where
normal fertilization by sexual intercourse is impossible. Artincial
Insemination Donor, AID, is the insemination of a married woman
by the sperm of a third party donor. In AID cases, the predomi
nate legal issue is whether the husband or the donor is the father.
No such issue exists in AIH cases because the husband is the
donor. In fact, AIH rarely poses any legal problems because the
child is viewed as the biological offspring of both parents. 7
Most legal problems in AID cases 8 arise when one parent
4. Brief for Defendant at 3-4, C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821
(Cumberland County Ct. 1977). At the time of trial, the child was over a year old and
had been cared for solely by C.C. Id. at 4. Plaintiff suggested that C.C. was living
with a girl friend and that they intended to raise the child together_ Brief for Plain
tiff, supra note 2, at 6. The court's opinion, however, is silent on this point.
S. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 161, 377 A.2d 821, 821 (Cumberland
County Ct. 1977). Defendant argued that she seriously considered using B. as the
donor of the sperm and that it was only after discussing it with C.M. that she
changed her mind and decided to use him. Brief for Defendant, supra note 4, at 8.
6. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 100, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431
(Sur. Ct. 1973). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 33-36
infra.
7. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 100, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431
(Sur. Ct. 1973). The court in Anonymous used the phrase "natural child" when de
scribing the AIH procedure. Id. at 100, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 431. The term is ill-advised
in the artificial insemination context because it connotes legal implications that tend
to be conclusory. Indeed, defendant argued that artificial insemination by definition
is directly opposed to the concept of "natural." Brief for Defendant, supra note 4, at
2-3.
8. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 100, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431
(Sur. Ct. 1973). The AID procedure may be performed with the consent of the hus
band (consensual) or without it (nonconsensual). The few reported cases involving
consensual AID include: People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 7 (1968); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99,345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur.

1979]

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION

625

questions the legitimacy of an AID child in a divorce or support
action. 9 In the typical AID setting couples go to a sperm bank
where a doctor selects the donor. Donors are often medical stu
dents whose physical characteristics resemble those of the husband.
The doctor usually selects, as a donor, a married man who is free
from congenital defects and has at least one normal child. Total
anonymity prevails. 10
The court in the instant case was presented with a unique fac
tual situation that matched neither the AID nor the AIH pattern.
Because the donee was a single woman, and the donor was not an
anonymous third party, the C.C. facts differ from an AID pattern.
If the instant case was decided on an AID theory, a serious ques
tion would arise about the legitimacy of the child. Under an AID
theory C. M. would be viewed as a volunteer with no connection to
either C.C. or the child, hence the child would be without a father
and by definition, illegitimate. If, on the other hand, the case was
decided on an AIH theory, the child would be legitimate, but the
court would be faced with the absence of a "marriage" con
templated by the AIH theory.
The court attempted to circumvent this impasse by drawing a
parallel between the manner of conception in the instant case and
conception by intercourse. It observed that, in this case, a woman
chose to have a baby and a man chose to provide -the needed
sperm. They were not married to each other and selected a
method for transmitting sperm other than by sexual intercourse.
The court, in C. M. v. C. C. ,11 noted that if conception took place

Ct. 1973); Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083,242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Peo
ple ex rei. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Of these, only
two, Dennett and Strnad, deal with the visitation rights of the father. While the court
in C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977),
did examine Strnad, it omitted Dennett altogether. For an analysis of both cases, see
text accompanying notes 21-27 infra. There are no reported cases on nonconsernmal
AID.
9. The court in Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct.
1948), has accepted the argument that an AID child is not technically of the hus
band's blood, but it allowed visitation rights.
10. A. ROSENFELD, THE SECOND GENESIS 153-54 (1969). The physician has a
great deal of responsibility in artificial insemination cases. Elaborate release or con
sent forms must be filled out and signed by the parties.
C.C. was turned away from the sperm bank. Not only were they not married, but
the policy of anonymity of the donor would have been violated as well. Accord,
Tucker, Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 33 WOMEN LAw. J. 57 (1947).
11. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 165,377 A.2d 821, 824 (Cumberland County Ct. 1977).
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by intercourse there would be no question that the 'donor' would
be the father. The court then framed the issue as whether C.M.
was any less a father because he provided the semen by a method
different from that normally used. 12 In addressing the issue of
fatherhood, the court returned to the question whether, under the
C.C. facts, th~ insemination was of the AID or AIR type. It rea
soned that C.C. was "more analogous" to the AIR situation.
Once it had drawn this conclusion, the court was forced to cast
C. M. in the AIR definitional requirement of husband. Drawing on
principles developed from its examination of AID cases, the C. C.
court found an obligation for support based upon an analogy to a
situation where a husband had consented to the artificial insemina
tion of his wife by a third party donor.13 This consent created a
relationship between the husband and the child that could not be
"assumed and disclaimed at will. "14 Rather, the "husband" must be
the "father" of the children for whom he is directly responsible.
After establishing C. M.'s moral and legal responsibility for the
child, the court went on to announce the policy that a child should
be "provided with a father as well as a mother. "15 It supported its
policy decision by finding that it was in the best interests of the
child to have two parents if possible. 16 Finally, the court noted that
12. [d. The statement of the issue is critical in C.C. because once couched in
these tenns, the resolution is almost preordained.
13. 152 N.J. Super. at 166, 377 A.2d at 824 (citing Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.
2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963) and People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280,
284, 437 P.2d 495, 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 11 (1968)). For a detailed examination of
these cases, see text accompanying notes 28 through 42 infra.
14. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 285, 437 P.2d 495, 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7,
11 (1968).
15. 152 N.J. Super. at 166, 377 A.2d at 824. The court set no guidelines for the
implementation of such a policy in the area of artificial insemination, nor did it rec
ognize any exceptions to its rather broad statement. It would be interesting to see
how such a policy would be viewed if, for example, a widow who had undergone the
AID procedure with the consent of her husband who died before conception, were
to discover that X, a medical student, was the donor of the semen used for her child's
conception. Using the C.C. court's analysis and policy considerations, if X sued for
visitation rights he would stand a good chance of success. There would be a known
donor who was able and willing to undertake responsibility for a child he helped
conceive. He would also provide the "second parent" that the court sees as the right
of every child. The argument should undoubtedly be made that since, at the time of
the donation, neither the medical student nor the mother had intended him to be the
father of the child, he should not later be allowed to assert the rights of a parent.
This note contends that the focus on the intent and conduct of both parties is the
proper one. See text accompanying note 60 infra.
16. 152 N.J. Super. at 167, 377 A.2d at 825. For a discussion of the best in
terests ofthe child standard, see text accompanying notes 43-50 infra.
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the donor was not anonymous, but rather was someone C.C. had
been acquainted with for at least two years.17 It also emphasized
that C. M. was not only in a good position to assume the respon
sibilities of fatherhood, he was also willing to do SO.18
The e. e. court's analysis is subject to criticism because the
court attempted to force this case into a traditional mold by draw
ing parallels to analyses in other artificial insemination cases with
out adequately examining the factual context in which the cases
took place. It missed the import of the relationship between the
parties. Instead, the court opted for whatever prior case law factu
ally approached e. e. without considering that those precedents
may be of little value where traditional relationships and motiva
tions are absent.
e. e. was unique because it could not be properly cast as
either an AID or AIR case. It differed from the AIR situation be
cause there was neither a husband nor was there a serious, on
going relationship which could be constructively viewed as a mar
riage. AID cases could not be profitably compared because there
was no third party donor; C.M. was known to C.C. and willingly
donated the sperm with knowledge of its intended use.
C.C.'s knowledge of the donor was a central element in the
court's decision to allow C. M. visitation rights to the child. The
court reasoned that in the usual AID19 situation, the donor, by
giving his semen anonymously, impliedly disclaims any responsibil
ity for its use. It then observed that C.C. had received the semen
from a friend whom she had known for two years. In reaching its
conclusion that the e. e. facts were more analogous to the AIR
cases, the court further observed that had the couple been mar
ried, C.M. would be the father, or if the child had been conceived
by intercourse, C. M. would be the father, whether married or not.
It then held that "if an unmarried woman conceives a child through
artificial insemination from semen from a known man, that man
cannot be considered any less a father because he is not married to
the woman. "20
In addition to the presence of a known donor, the e. e. court
17. See note 1 supra.
18. 152 N.J. Super. at 167-68, 377 A.2d at 825. Since C.M. was a teacher, the
court felt that he was able to contribute to both the educational and financial support
of the child. ld.
19. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra for a discussion of the usual AID
procedures.
20. 152 N.J. Super. at 163,377 A.2d at 824.
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relied on several artificial insemination cases and the abstract prin
ciple that it is in the best interests of a child to have two parents.
A brief examination of those cases will reveal the Significant factual
distinctions between C. C. and the earlier artificial insemination
cases that render the earlier cases inapplicable to C. C.
Two of the cases cited in C. C. deal with visitation rights of the
father after a valid divorce decree. In Strnad v. Strnad,21 plaintiff
wife brought an action against her husband seeking to terminate his
visitation rights with their minor child. The wife had been artifi
cially inseminated by a third party donor with the husband's con
sent during their marriage. The court was not persuaded by the
wife's claim that defendant husband was an unfit guardian, finding
instead that the best interests of the child called for the visits. 22
The court did not directly address the issue of whether the hus
band was the father of the AID child, holding instead that he had
potentially or semi-adopted the child. From this it reasoned that
the husband was entitled to the same rights as those normally
granted a foster parent who had formally adopted a child. 23
A slightly different issue was examined in People ex rei. Aba
jian v. Dennett, 24 where a man brought an action against his wife
to enforce custody arrangements provided for in their separation
agreement. She claimed that since both of their children were born
as a result of artificial insemination, plaintiff was not the father of
the children, and therefore should not be allowed any custody or
visitation rights. 25 The court, in holding for the plaintiff, dissal
lowed the defendant's artificial insemination claim on the ground
that the defendant, in agreeing to the language of the divorce de
cree, furnished "sufficient legal basis to estop the assertion of any
contrary claim."26 Moreover, to allow the defendant's claim would
be, according to the court, contrary to the best interests of the
children. A decision for the defendant would create illegitimacy, a
result which the court would not allow as "parens patriae" for the
children.
21.

190 Misc. 786,78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).

22.
23.

[d. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
[d. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.

24. 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
25. Plaintiff also challenged the general fitness of his ex-wife to retain custody
of the children. [d. at 262-63, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 182. On this issue the court held that
the plaintiff's evidence had not shown a sufficient change of circumstances in the
relationship between his ex-wife and the children to warrant a modification of the
separation agreement. [d. at 265, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
26. [d. at 263, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
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Direct comparison of Strnad and Dennett with C. C. is not in
structive. Strnad and Dennett dealt with married couples who used
AID procedures with the knowledge and consent of both parties.
In both cases the children knew their parents and had lived with
them as a family for some period of time. These cases may be
instructive, however, because they point out the factors courts
examine when attempting to fashion a remedy where judicial or
legislative guidance is lacking. In Strnad, the court looked to the
interaction of the child with the defendant and determined that the
relationship was akin to adoption. 27 Dennett is particularly en
lightening in this vein because it examined the actions of both par
ties, estopping one from claiming a construction of the facts that
would have been clearly inconsistent with earlier behavior. In both
cases, then, the courts emphasized the actions of the parties and
the nature of their relationship.
At least one court has held that an AID child is illegitimate,
but found the father's duty to support on another theory. In
Gursky v. Gursky, 28 a husband brought an action for annulment
and separation. 29 The evidence presented at trial indicated that
shortly after their marriage, the Gurskys discovered that they
would not be able to bear children. After seeking medical advice,
the couple decided that the wife would be artificially inseminated
by a third party donor. Further evidence indicated that both par
ties signed consent forms for the procedure. In addition, the hus
band promised to pay for all medical expenses. After the child was
born, the birth certificate listed the plaintiff as the father and de
fendant as the mother of the child.
The Gursky court found that a child conceived by the AID
procedure was not the legitimate issue of the husband. 30 However,
he could be held responsible for the support of an AID child under
a theory of implied contract and equitable estoppel. 31 Under this
theory, the court determines if a legal agreement can be inferred
27. The OpinIOn omits the specific facts of defendant's interaction with his
child. In arriving at its opinion the court also assumed that the AID procedure was
done with the consent of the husband. 190 Misc. at 788,78 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
28. 39 Misc. 2d 1083,242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
29. Plaintiff specifically pleaded for an annulment based upon a failure of con
summation of the marriage, and for separation on the ground of abandonment and
cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. at 1084, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 407-08.
30. Id. at 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
31. Id. The court cited two New York cases as support for its theory, Renner v.
John T. Stanley Co., 136 Misc. 492, 493, 240 N.Y.S. 148, 149 (1930), and Wells v.
Mann, 45 N.Y. 327 (1871).
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from the facts and circumstances of the case even though no formal
agreement was made by the parties. If the court finds such an
agreement, then the breaching party will be held liable. After ex
amining the evidence, the court held that there was an implied
contract between plaintiff and defendant to conceive the child, and
the husband was estopped from denying his obligation to support
the child. 32
The conduct of the parties was also closely scrutinized in In re
Adoption of Anonymous 33 where the petitioner was attempting to
adopt his wife's child from her first marriage. The child had been
conceived by consensual AID during her first marriage. The ex
husband was listed as the father of the child on the birth certifi
cate. After the divorce he was allowed visitation rights and com
plied with all the support conditions of the decree. H~ refused,
however I to consent34 to the stepfather's adoption of the child. The
petitioner argued that such consent was not required because the
first husband was not the natural father of the child.
The court held that "a child born of consensual AID during a
valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and
privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage. "35 It
grounded its opinion on a strong statutory policy in favor of legiti
macy, finding that "it would seem absurd to hold illegitimate a
child born during a valid marriage, of parents desiring but unable
to conceive a child, and both consenting and agreeing to the im
pregnation of the mother by a carefully and medically selected
anonymous donor. "36
32. 39 Misc. 2d at 1088-89,242 N.Y.S.2d at 411-12.
33. 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
34. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § III (McKinney 1977). Consent is required under
subsection 1 of the statute:
1. Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption
shall be required as follows:
(a) Of the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge
or surrogate in his discretion dispenses with such consent;
(b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child
born in wedlock;
(c) Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wed
lock;
(d) Of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the
adoptive child.
35. 74 Misc. 2d at 105, 345 N.Y.S. 2d at 435-36. In so holding the court ex
pressly overruled the Gursky decision that had held such a child to be illegitimate.
ld. at 104, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
36. ld. at 104-05, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
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Perhaps the most frequently cited artificial insemination case is
People v. Sorensen. 37 Sorensen involved a criminal prosecution
against a husband for failure to support a minor child conceived
through consensual AID and born during his marriage. 38 Defen
dant and his wife had agreed to use the AID procedure after fifteen
years of marriage. They consulted a physician and signed an
agreement regarding the procedures to be used. The defendant
also signed a consent form permitting his wife to undergo the pro
cedure. She subsequently became pregnant and bore a child. The
defendant lived with his wife and child for about four years during
which time he treated the child as his own and represented to
friends that he was the child's father. The couple separated when
the child was four years old. After the separation, Mrs. Sorensen
requested no support payments for the child.
Two years later, Mrs. Sorensen became unable to work due to
illness and applied for and received public assistance from the
County of Sonoma, California. The defendant made no support
payments to the child although a demand for support was made by
the district attorney.39 The court framed the issue as whether the
husband of a woman who had submitted to an AID procedure with
his consent was guilty of failing to support the child. It held that
Sorensen was the father of the child and that his "conduct carries
with it an obligation for support."40 In arriving at its conclusion,
the court found that an AID child did not have a "natural father"
since the anonymous donor was "no more responsible for the use
made of his sperm than is the donor of blood or a kidney. "41 It
sought, instead, to determine who was the lawful father.
The court ruled that the defendant was the lawful father of the
child. It held that a husband who consented to an AID procedure
must bear "the legal responsibilities for fatherhood."42
37. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
38. Suit was brought by the welfare authorities pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE
~ 270 (West Supp. 1978).
39. The demand was made pursuant to the California Penal Code. See id.
40. Id. at 284, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 285, 437 P.2d at 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The court construed the word
"father" in the statute to include a husband who chooses to use the semen of a third
party donor to inseminate his wife for the purposes of conceiving a child. Id. at 286,
437 P.2d at 499-500,66 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11. This finding was grounded on the court's
premise that "[o]ne who consents to the production of a child cannot create a tem
porary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at will, but the arrangement must be
of such character as to impose an obligation of supporting those for whose existence
he is directly responsible." Id. at 285, 437 P.2d at 499,66 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
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In each of the cases discussed thus far, Strnad, Dennett,
Gursky, Anonymous, and Sorensen, the court relied on one or
more of the following elements in finding a "father" for the child:
evidence of a marriage, written evidence of the parties' intent at
the time of insemination, evidence that the child had lived or in
teracted with both parents, or evidence of conduct forming the
basis for an implied contract or equitable estoppel. C.C. and C.M.
were not married nor were they seriously involved beyond a casual
dating relationship over a two year period. Since the insemination
procedure was not accomplished at a sperm bank or under the
auspices of a doctor, there was no documentary evidence to be
examined. The child, who at the time of the trial was one year old,
had never met C. M. and could not, therefore, have cultivated the
psychological and emotional relationship with C. M. that the chil
dren in all the preceding artificial insemination cases had devel
oped with their fathers. Perhaps realizing the lack of appropriate
factual elements to justify treating C.M. as a lawful father, the C.C.
court invoked the best interests of the child test to reach what it
felt was a desirable result.
The New Jersey courts traditionally use the best interests of
the child test, as formulated in Baker v. Baker, 43 to evaluate a pa
rent's visitation right. In Baker, the question before the court in
volved access by a father to his illegitimate child who was in the
mother's custody. The court held that the best interests of the
child called for visits by the father unless the mother could show
that the visits would be harmful. 44 In 1971, R. v. F.45 reaffirmed
this test by holding that the father of an illegitimate child possessed
visitation rights without the express or implied consent of the
mother.
In allowing the visitation rights, the court was strongly per
suaded by the following facts: the couple had lived together as
husband and wife for approximately one year before the child was
born, and had engaged in a private, unlicensed ritual of marriage;
the couple wore wedding rings and lived together as a family; the
father demonstrated strong interest in and actively cared for the
child while the "family" remained together; and finally, the wife

43. 81 N.J. Eq. 135, 85 A. 816 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1913). The court equated
the visitation rights issue to that of custody which uses the same standard. ld.
44. ld. at 139, 85 A. at 816.
45. 113 N.J. Super. 396,273 A.2d 808 (1971).
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left her husband because she wanted to make a clean start with her
child. 46
A close reading of R. v. F. reveals the C.C. court's concern
with characterizing C.M. as the "natural father" of the child. New
Jersey law mandates that the mother of an illegitimate child shall
have custody and control of the child and the putative father shall
have no access to the child without the mother's consent. 47 The R.
v. F. court found that the "admitted father who showed an active
interest in the child's welfare should not be classified as a 'putative'
father. "48
Similarly, the C.C. court found a factual basis for C.M.'s as
serted paternity from a casual dating relationship and C. M.'s
statement that he "fully intended to assume the responsibilities of
parenthood."49 There was, however, no examination of C.C.'s in
tent, the significance of the unusual fact situation, or the possible
adverse impact which C.M.'s visits could have on the child. Rather
than carefully examining the possible adverse impact of allowing
visitation, the court simply decided that "[i]t is in a child's best
interests to have two parents whenever possible."50
The C. C. court's "best interest" approach was coupled with its
underlying conviction that the biological parents-that is, the pro
viders of the sperm and egg-have a strong, instinctive, and posi
tive tie to the child regardless of the circumstances. 51 Others ar
Id. at 399-400, 273 A.2d at BI0.
The statute provides:
The mother of an illegitimate child, whether married or single, shall
have the exclusive right to its custody and control and the putative father of
such child shall have no right of custody, control or access to such child
without the mother's consent. If, however, it is proved that the mother is
unfit to have the custody and control of such child, the Superior Court or
any other court which may have jurisdiction in the premises may make any
order touching the custody or control of such child which might heretofore
have been made.
This section is intended to be declaratory of the existing law upon this
subject and it shall, under no circumstances, be construed as an implication
that the rights of such a mother have hitherto been less than as herein above
defined.
Amended by L.1953, c. 9, p. 80 § 26.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:16-1 (West 1976).
4B. 113 N.J. Super. at 407, 273 A.2d at B14. The court also found that the issue
of fatherhood would not have to be determined through a formal bastardy proceed
ing, but could be accomplished by voluntary admission. Id. at 40B, 273 A.2d at B14
15.
49. 152 N.J. Super. at 167,377 A.2d at B24.
50. Id. at 167, 377 A.2d at B25.
51. This would appear to be the view taken by some in the field of family law.
46.
47.
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gue, however, that the physical realities of conception and birth
are not the direct cause of the child's emotional attachment.
Rather, they are the result of "day-to-day attention to his needs for
physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. "52
The latter view stresses the psychological relationship between pa
rent and child rather than the biological relationship. "An absent
biological parent will remain or tend to become a stranger."53
The New York Court of Appeals recently addressed this issue
in Bennet v. Jeffreys, 54 where the natural mother petitioned to ob
tain custody of her child from its guardian after a prolonged separa
tion. In remanding the case, the court outlined the pertinent con
siderations of the best interests test as: the length of custody of the
non-parent custodian, testimony of a psychologist that returning to
the mother would be "very traumatic for the child," the mother's
current fitness, "the circumstances and environment of the custo
dian, the stability of her household, her inability to adopt, her age,
and any other circumstances bearing upon the fitness or adequacy
of a child's custodian over the whole period of childhood. . . . "55
This test as applied in Jeffreys would allow a parent the "right" to
rear his or her child 56 unless "extraordinary circumstances" dictate
that the best interests of the child warrant different treatment. 57
The unique fact situation in C.C. militates toward the kind of
test applied in Jeffreys. The child in Jeffreys had never known its
"father" and at the time of the appeal, it was well over a year old.
Similarly, in C.C., the child had never known its "father" while
the mother had adequately provided for the child, and had apSome commentators, however, have found this position somewhat anomalous in light
of the many cases of infanticide, infant-battery, child neglect, abuse, and abandon
ment. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A.J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 17 (1973).
52. Id.
53. Id. The authors emphasize that the role of the psychological parent could
be filled by any adult who has day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared
experiences with the child. But it could never be done by an "absent, inactive adult,
whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may be." Id. at 19.
54. 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976). The mother had
given up her child, now an eight-year-old girl, shortly after birth, to a fonner school
mate of the child's grandmother. Id. at 544,356 N.E.2d at 280,387 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
55. Id. at 552, 356 N.E.2d at 285,387 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
56. The child would have the concomitant right to be reared by the parent. Id.
at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
57. This rule implicitly recognizes the great care courts must take in utilizing
their parens patriae power. Under current constitutional principles, courts could not
displace parents "except for grievous cause or necessity." Id. See generally Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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parently bestowed upon it all the love and care any parent would.
The court should have considered the possible detrimental impact
that the intrusion of C. M. would have upon the child. The result of
not making the child illegitimate is a laudable one, but it should
not be achieved at the expense of the child's psychological well~
being. Rather than basing its decision on the premise that a child
should have two parents whenever possible, the court should have
weighed the potential social and emotional harm in the case against
the intangible benefit of exposing the child to its "biological"
father. 58
The C. C. decision, then, rests on three grounds: the lack of an
anonymous donor which allowed the court to treat the case as an
AIH situati~n; several earlier cases which held that a man who con~
sents to artificial insemination while in a family setting has the
rights and duties of a father; and finally, the court's notion that it is
in the best interests of a child to have two parents. These grounds,
taken either separately or together, do not provide an entirely
satisfactory basis for the decision.
The facts of C.C. clearly indicate that C.C. specifically in
tended nothing more than a casual relationship with C.M. There
was never any sexual relationship between the two, nor did they
ever live together as friends or roommates. No conduct by either
party indicated an awareness or expectation of anything but a
casual relationship. Yet disregarding overwhelming evidence to the
contrary, the court impliedly created a stronger relationship for the
benefit of the child. Further, even after C.C. decided to use C.M.
as the donor, there was never a hint of anything personal or inti
mate between them. The procedure itself was conducted in a very
mechanical and impersonal manner. The method used to impreg
nate C.C. should have put C.M. on notice that C.C. viewed him
solely as a volunteer. 59
58. The court seems to assume, without specifically stating, that a child needs a
male parent to be raised properly. There was some evidence that C.C. was living
with a girl friend and that they intended to raise the child together. Brief for Plain
tiff, supra note 4, at 6. Plaintiff argued that it would be harmful for a male child to be
raised "without the knowledge and benefit of a father figure." Id. He further argued
that the defendant had not demonstrated that a father's entrance into the child's life
at this point would have any harmful impact on the child. Id. If the court accepted
this argument, it made an error in not substantiating it with at least some empirical
evidence. This would seem especially true because many single parents are cur
rently adopting children. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 51, at 62.
59. This argument was made by the defendant but discounted by the court
which found that plaintiff had not waived his parental rights. Brief for Defendant,
supra note 4, at 3-4.
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The question of intent is curiously absent from the C. C. opin
ion, with the exception of the court's finding that C. M. "fully in
tended to assume the responsibilities of parenthood. "60 The court
did not examine or discuss what C.C.'s intent may have been, nor
does the court seem concerned that the facts do not logically sub
stantiate C. M.'s assertion of marital intent.
The major flaws in the C. C. court's analysis are its rigid
adherence to. the traditional conviction that every child should have
a father, and its unwillingness to search beyond the field of family
law for a possible solution to the question before it. The court
failed to realize that novel fact situations sometimes call for novel
approaches. Rather than confine itself to family law principles, the
court should have explored two areas of contract law, implied
contract-equitable estoppel and express contract.
The implied contract-equitable estoppel approach had already
been used by the Gursky court and can be readily adapted to the
C.C. fact situation. The inquiry should focus on the conduct and
declarations of both parties. If the plaintiff had been led to believe
that he was to be the father of the child and the husband of C.C.,
and that was his motivation for agreeing to the procedure, then
C.C. would be estopped from asserting a contrary argument. If, on
the other hand, there was no such evidence, C. M. would be pre
cluded from asserting any rights to the child. The burden of proof
should be on plaintiff since he is the one seeking to change the
status quo.
A second approach would require an express contract. Absent
an express contract, the court would refuse to enforce an asserted
right of access to the child. While this solution may seem some
what draconian in the family law setting, in a case such as C.C.,
the nature of the conception itself should put the parties on notice
that some kind of formal agreement is advisable. In addition to
realistically giving effect to the parties' intent, this approach may
also prompt needed legislative action.
The C. C. court's failure to confront the full range of implica
tions generated by the instant fact situation illustrates the danger of
some courts' tendencies to view a case solely as a contract, tort, or
family law problem. Once a case has been labelled, many courts
limit their analysis to one category, excluding any theories or ap
proaches not within the traditional field. The C. C. result illustrates
the problem well. The court recognized the uniqueness of the case,
60.

162 N.J. Super. at 163,377 A.2d at 824.
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but refused to look beyond family law rubric. Instead, it settled for
an analogy within the artificial insemination context that in many
respects is unsatisfactory. The law need not and should not be read
so restrictively. Employing an express or implied contract-equi
table estoppel approach may be extremely helpful in such novel
areas as artificial insemination. These approaches focus on the facts
of the individual case, and militate against the kind of loose com
parisons engaged in by the c. c. court. This kind of judicial pio
neering would be especially useful in light of the increasing num
ber of cases for which there is no legal precedent or legislative
guidelines for courts to follow. As in C.C., these cases are often
prompted by scientific advancement not anticipated by the law.
"There is always a painful lag before the mechanisms and attitudes
of society, including the law, catch up with the new reality that
science has wrought. "61 Courts, by responding to novel problems
with flexible approaches, can minimize this lag between the law
and technological reality.

Daniel Lennon Saxe
61.

A. ROSENFELD, supra note 10, at 6.

